Who Enters the Age of Electricity? And Who Pays the Price?

The COP31 Presidency Initiative to Reach 35% Electrification by 2035

Habib Maalouf

On the road to the thirty-first Conference of the Parties on climate change (COP31) in Antalya, the Turkish COP Presidency is putting forward an ambitious initiative under the title “35 by 35,” meaning raising the share of electricity in total global final energy consumption to 35% by 2035.

It is important from the outset to clarify the nature of this initiative. So far, it is not a negotiated target adopted by countries in a decision issued by the Conference of the Parties, but rather a voluntary initiative and pledge led by the COP31 Presidency, calling on governments, the private sector, cities, international organizations, and civil society to support it and contribute to its implementation. The text of the global pledge was launched on 21 September 2026.

This is where the questions that go beyond the figure itself begin: Where will this electricity come from? Who will pay for it? Who will own its grids and technologies? Who will be able to afford the cost of shifting to it? And what about the hundreds of millions of people who do not have electricity at all? Because the transition to an “age of electricity” does not mean the same thing for everyone in the world, the question also becomes: 35% for whom?

According to the latest data tracking Sustainable Development Goal 7, published by the International Energy Agency and its partners in June 2026, around 655 million people worldwide were still without access to electricity in 2024, including more than 560 million in sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, around two billion people live without access to clean cooking technologies and fuels. These figures change the meaning of talking about “electrification.” In wealthy economies, electrification may mean replacing a gasoline-powered car with an electric vehicle, replacing a gas heating system with a heat pump, or increasing electricity consumption in data centres and artificial intelligence.

In an African or Asian village without access to electricity, however, electrification may mean, for the first time, lighting a home, operating a school, running a health centre, or powering a water pump.

It is therefore not enough to ask: How do we reach 35%?

We must also ask: 35% of what, for whom, and under what conditions?

Will the increase in electricity go primarily to economies that already consume enormous quantities of it, or will electrification also become a tool for closing the energy gap and addressing electricity poverty?

Why Electricity Specifically?

The initiative is based on a real transformation that is already taking place in the global energy system. According to a new International Energy Agency report prepared at the request of Türkiye and Australia as part of their partnership with COP31, electricity currently represents around 23% of global final energy consumption. The Agency indicates that technologies available today, if their full economic potential is utilized, could raise this share to around 33%. It therefore considers a 35% share by 2035 technically and economically within reach.

The reason is clear: electricity is more efficient in a number of end uses. An electric car, for example, converts electricity into motion more efficiently than an internal combustion engine uses final energy. Some industrial, heating, and cooling applications can also become more efficient when shifted to electricity.

But an essential distinction must be made here: electrification does not mean decarbonization. Electricity is not an energy source in itself, but an energy carrier. If electricity comes from coal or gas, converting a car or factory to electricity does not necessarily mean achieving a low-carbon economy.

This is why the text of the “35 by 35” initiative itself links electrification with the expansion of renewable energy, energy efficiency, storage, system flexibility, and modern grids.

In other words, the real question is not: How much electricity do we want? Rather: What kind of electricity do we want?

The Problem Is Not Only Power Generation

There is another aspect that is less visible in the discussion: electricity grids. In its 2026 report on “modernizing electricity grids,” the International Energy Agency concluded that meeting projected demand growth through 2035 will require increasing grid capacity by at least 30%, meaning the addition or replacement of around 25 million kilometres of power lines. The Agency expects around three-quarters of the required increase to take place in emerging market and developing economies.

This means the issue is not simply building more solar or wind power plants. We need transmission and distribution grids, transformers, storage, smart management systems, and the capacity to absorb variable renewable energy production. This may be one of the biggest bottlenecks facing the energy transition. It is possible to generate electricity without being able to deliver it to where people need it. At that point, the grid shifts from being merely technical infrastructure to becoming an issue of justice.

Who Will Pay for the Grids?

The official text of the “35 by 35” initiative explicitly recognizes the need to mobilize greater amounts of accessible, concessional, and affordable financing for grids, storage, and greater system flexibility, particularly in least developed countries, small island developing states, and other developing economies. This is a central point for countries of the Global South. The question is not only: Does the technology exist? It is also: Can countries obtain and finance it?

Solar panels, batteries, or electric vehicles may be more economically viable over their operating lifespan, but the upfront investment may be beyond the reach of poor households and heavily indebted countries. Therefore, declining technology costs do not necessarily mean declining access costs. This is where the cost of capital becomes part of climate justice.

A country that can borrow at low interest rates can build its grids and transform its energy system faster than a country that pays high borrowing costs.

The “35% target” therefore cannot be separated from the broader debate on climate finance: grants, concessional finance, debt, guarantees, and private investment. This brings us back to the traditional problems raised at climate conferences, namely the shortage of financing.

From Oil to Minerals?

There is another question that may be even more profound: if the age of oil reshaped the global economy and politics around control over oil and gas, could the age of electricity reshape them around minerals, technology, and supply chains?

The expansion of grids, batteries, electric vehicles, and renewable energy requires large quantities of copper, lithium, graphite, nickel, and other rare and critical minerals. This opens the possibility of a new form of dependency. If countries of the Global South remain primarily extractors of raw materials, while processing, advanced manufacturing, technological ownership, and patents remain concentrated in other countries, we may be moving from dependence on fossil fuels to dependence on minerals and technology.

This does not mean rejecting initiatives such as electrification. Rather, it means that the question must become:

Will the electrical revolution transfer economic and technological value to resource-producing countries, or will it merely transfer resources out of them?

Technology transfer, capacity-building, local manufacturing, and added value therefore become part of climate justice, rather than merely trade issues.

Are We Moving from One Form of Dependency to Another?

This may be one of the most important questions for the Arab world and developing countries.

A just energy transition should not mean that developing countries import electric vehicles, solar panels, batteries, transformers, software, and control systems while exporting minerals and raw materials. Otherwise, the form of the energy system may change, while countries’ position within the global division of labour may remain largely unchanged.

Talking about “clean technology” therefore should not be limited to the price and efficiency of technology. It should also answer questions such as: Who produces it? Who owns it? Who sets its standards? Who owns the knowledge? Who manufactures it? And who captures the economic value generated by it?

Who Gets Priority?

The paradox is that one of the new drivers of electricity demand is the digital economy itself.

The International Energy Agency says that growth in electricity consumption in recent years has been linked, among other factors, to cooling, electric vehicles, manufacturing, data centres, and artificial intelligence.

This raises a new political and ethical issue: if electricity becomes a strategic resource, who should have priority access to it? Should priority go to hospitals, schools, homes, public transport, and local industry? Or to energy-intensive data centres?

The question does not stem from rejecting artificial intelligence, but from how priorities should be set in the use of a strategic resource when demand for it is increasing.

This debate will become increasingly important as data centres and the digital economy expand.

Do We Electrify Consumption, or Change the Consumption Model?

We can move from a gasoline-powered car to an electric car, from a gas heater to an electric heater, and from a fuel-dependent factory to an electricity-powered one. But what if the overall level of consumption remains the same, or increases?

Would we then have addressed the climate crisis, or merely electrified a consumption model that needed to be reconsidered in the first place?

The distinction is fundamental. One city can replace millions of fuel-powered cars with millions of electric vehicles. Another city can reduce the need for cars altogether through public transport, urban planning, and shorter travel distances.

We can improve the efficiency of cooling appliances, but we can also reduce the need for cooling through insulation, urban design, tree planting, and expanding public parks.

In other words, there is a difference between electrifying consumption and rethinking how much energy we actually need in the first place.

This brings us back to the concept of energy efficiency, not merely as a technical improvement, but as a question about ways of life, production, and consumption—and about adopting a new civilizational model, perhaps an old one, that requires less energy.

What About Lebanon?

Lebanon can serve as a small case that reveals the scale of the problem.

Lebanon’s electricity crisis has never been merely a problem of fuel sources or the number of power plants. It is also a problem of the grid, investment, financing, waste, governance, distribution, and the relationship between the public and private sectors.

The Lebanese question in the age of electricity therefore should not only be: How do we produce more electricity?

Rather: How do we build an electricity system that is fairer, more efficient, and more reliable?

The transition to solar energy, for example, can reduce dependence on fossil fuels, but at the same time it can create new inequalities if households that can afford to install panels and batteries gain more stable electricity, while poorer households remain dependent on the grid or private generators. Here too, the distinction appears between owning energy technology and having the right to a reliable and affordable electricity service.

What Should Countries of the Global South Ask at COP31?

If “35 by 35” becomes a major focus of energy discussions at COP31, it would be useful for the debate not to be limited to supporting or rejecting electrification. Developing countries should instead raise a set of practical questions: Who will finance new electricity grids in developing countries? How can the cost of capital be reduced? How will electricity reach the 655 million people who still lack access to it? How will poor households be protected from the cost of the transition? How can we ensure that additional electricity will be low-emission? Who will bear the environmental burdens of mineral extraction? How can technology be transferred and local industrial capacities built? Will mineral-producing countries become industrial partners, or remain suppliers of raw materials? How can we ensure that data centres and other emerging energy-intensive sectors do not compete with basic needs? How can electrification be linked with policies to reduce waste and unnecessary consumption? And does the promise by developed countries to developing countries that technology transfer would serve as compensation for historically higher emissions in industrialized countries and the growing disasters faced by developing countries still hold?

These questions do not oppose the “35 by 35” initiative; rather, they test the conditions of its fairness and effectiveness.

It Is Not Only About 35%

In the end, the figure of 35% may be less important than the questions it opens up.

The world is indeed entering a phase in which electricity is becoming increasingly important, and International Energy Agency data confirms that electricity demand is growing faster than total energy demand. But the transition to an “age of electricity” can take more than one form. It can represent a shift from coal, oil, and gas to low-carbon electricity, supported by modern grids, fair financing, and universal access to energy.

It can also, by contrast, become a massive new market for technology, minerals, and infrastructure while inequalities in access to energy and economic value persist.

The question that should therefore accompany “35 by 35” is not only: How do we reach a 35% share of electricity in energy consumption by 2035? Rather: What kind of world do we want to build with this electricity? A world in which electricity is cleaner, but also fairer? Or a world in which we electrify old consumption patterns, extract more minerals, and build more grids and data centres while a large part of the world remains outside the system? Would we simply move from a finite fuel to a scarce one, only to find ourselves facing new crises after a relatively short period?

A genuine energy transition is measured not only by the quantity of electricity we produce, but also by who has access to it, who pays for it, who owns the technology, who benefits from its value, who bears the cost of extracting its resources, how we use it, and whether it truly reduces the depletion of nature or merely reproduces it in a new form.

Perhaps this is the real question that should reach Antalya: not only how much electricity do we want, but for what kind of life, for what kind of economy, for what kind of world, and for which generations?