Lebanon at War: Between External Conflict and Internal Crisis

Wars: Comprehensive Confrontations

Wars are not fought solely with weapons, tanks, and technology; they are violent and comprehensive confrontations in which two (or more) parties deploy all elements of power available to them in order to gain an advantage over their opponent. In today’s world, no one fully wins, and no one loses everything. Due to the complex and multi-layered nature of wars as comprehensive confrontations, military victory—especially if limited or relative—does not automatically translate into equivalent political outcomes. This is because other factors—international and domestic political power, economic and social strength, as well as moral and psychological elements—can either reinforce, modify, or constrain the political and economic consequences of military outcomes.

Moreover, no war, even a localized one, takes place outside a broader global context and balance of power that also shapes its trajectory. Another often-overlooked factor is the historical context, the characteristics of society and the state in the countries involved, their past experiences, and the competence of those leading the overall confrontation—not just the military dimension.

Wars eventually come to an end—sooner or later—either through surrender (the most extreme translation of military superiority into political terms) or through negotiations that lead to settlements and agreements. These settlements are not a simple extension of the military balance of power. Political, geopolitical, and internal factors—such as the state of the “home front” and the effectiveness of negotiation teams—can reshape outcomes. Simplistic narratives often frame military confrontation in opposition to negotiation, but this is a metaphysical misunderstanding that separates means from ends. In reality, those who possess and effectively manage comprehensive elements of power can achieve gains whether through war or negotiation. Conversely, those who lack sufficient power—or fail to manage it properly—are likely to lose in the overall outcome, regardless of whether they engage in war or diplomacy. The issue, therefore, is not the form or mechanisms, but the possession and management of comprehensive power and the ability to engage in strategic confrontation—whether chosen or imposed.

External and Internal Objectives

War, like all social phenomena, is inherently complex. It is waged to achieve multiple objectives, not just a single one—even if propaganda suggests otherwise. Broadly speaking, wars pursue two main types of objectives: external and internal. There is war against the outside and war within. This duality is evident in the ongoing war in Lebanon.

Israel’s War on Lebanon

In reality, Israel is waging two wars. The first is aimed at achieving internal objectives within Israel itself—primarily consolidating the authority of the far-right government led by Netanyahu (not the focus here). The second is directed at Lebanon and has two sub-components.

The first is the war against Hezbollah, characterized primarily by military operations: airstrikes, bombardment, killings, and ground incursions to establish positions or occupation zones. This is a direct military confrontation between two sides.

The second is a more insidious war against the Lebanese state. This includes both direct military actions—attacks, destruction, displacement, and the devastation of border villages—and broader pressure aimed at weakening the state. The objectives are twofold: first, to undermine efforts to restore the Lebanese state’s authority and role—an Israeli strategic goal to ensure its security by surrounding itself with weak states; and second, to weaken Lebanon’s ability to mobilize diplomatic and political resources that could counterbalance Israel’s overwhelming military superiority. In extreme scenarios, Israel seeks to impose a submissive or aligned government.

Israel has adopted a highly calculated military and political strategy aimed—explicitly or implicitly—at increasing the risk of internal instability in Lebanon. It relies on the lingering effects of the civil war, ongoing divisions, and the political and social fragmentation exacerbated since Lebanon’s liberation in 2000 and the progressive hollowing out of state authority, which reached its peak during the 2024 Gaza support war.

War Against Israel and Against the State Project

Seven overlapping confrontations are taking place on Lebanese territory. From the Israeli side:

From the Lebanese side:

There is a clear contradiction between the two sides: the government seeks to restore state authority and monopoly over war and peace decisions, while Hezbollah’s project depends on maintaining armed activity outside state structures. This contradiction raises serious concerns—given Lebanon’s history—that it could escalate into internal conflict, especially as obstructing the state-building project may serve Hezbollah’s internal objectives.

In Lebanon, the Government Is Not the Sole Authority

For non-Lebanese readers, it is important to recall that the monopoly over legitimate force defines the modern state. In Lebanon, the “state project” means ensuring that authority resides within state institutions—not outside them. This situation is unusual in the Arab world, where power is typically centralized within ruling institutions.

In Lebanon, however, power has historically existed outside formal institutions—particularly since the 1990s under Syrian influence—and decision-making authority has often been external or parallel to the state. This reached its peak in recent years, with decisions of war and peace entirely outside state control (as in 2006, 2024, and now 2026), alongside the internal paralysis of institutions due to political domination.

The ongoing military confrontation with Israel is also used to legitimize internal objectives, particularly obstructing the state-building project. If the state succeeds in reclaiming authority, parallel power structures would inevitably weaken. This explains the flexibility shown by Amal and Hezbollah regarding the implementation of the November 2024 agreement on weapons south of the Litani River, while strongly rejecting discussions about weapons north of the Litani due to their importance for internal objectives.

In Lebanon, the Government Is Not the Sole Authority

What conclusions can be drawn?

Confronting Israel requires addressing both categories of objectives. On one hand, the military confrontation must be managed through ceasefire efforts, adherence to international law, and diplomatic engagement to limit losses and reduce harmful conditions. On the other hand, it is equally necessary to confront Israel’s strategic objective of undermining the Lebanese state, which requires a bold and effective internal strategy.

There is no room for simplistic prioritization. The true strategic response to Israeli aggression lies in successfully building a functioning state—one where authority resides within constitutional institutions. Today, while Lebanon has a government, it is neither the sole nor the strongest center of power. As long as this remains the case, Lebanon cannot effectively confront Israel—or any other threat—in a way that serves its national interests.